PKSOI Bulletin

Director's Corner

Welcome to this issue of the PKSOI Bulletin. Once again, we're fortunate to have contributions from a number of talented professionals in the stability operations community of interest and/or practice. As a consequence, we have several articles enclosed in response to our theme: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations: Roles, Responsibilities, and Missions.

We offer as a starting point the January 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report [Go to QRM]. As broad as the report is, it still leaves us several questions related to our theme that practitioners, policy-makers, and pundits alike continue to discuss. Often heard questions include the following:

COL John Kardos, Director PKSOI

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What are stability operations? When are they the same as peacekeeping or nation-building? When are they different?

What is the proper timing to engage in peacekeeping or stability operations? What can be done to prevent or transform conflict as well as manage the post-conflict environment? What is the end-state?

Who does peacekeeping and stability operations? Is it the U.S. primarily, U.S.-lead in a multinational partnership or even U.S. as a junior partner? Are these operations inherently military in nature, or just until some other agency/organization/individual is available? If it is a military function—whether short- or long-term—then what are the respective roles of the Services, specific career fields, and/or designated units?

Who does this in the civilian sectors? Is it strictly government and non-government organizations, or do the private sector and transnational corporations also have roles and responsibilities?

Finally, what are the knowledge, skills, and attributes of the team member or leader of a peacekeeping or stability operation?

The answers to these questions are not easy or linear. However, choosing one course or another results in a corresponding commitment of resources—money, people, and time. Therefore, these questions are deserving of thought, research, and experimentation.

Our authors do not answer all of these questions, but together they provide interesting insights and perspectives that give a holistic view of the theme. Captain Heather Coyne, of the HQDA Stability Operations Division, HQDA G3/5/7 and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP),

Report Documentation Page		*Form Approved* *OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE **20 MAY 2009**	2. REPORT TYPE **Quarterly Bulletin**	3. DATES COVERED **00-04-2009 to 00-07-2009**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **PKSOI Bulletin, Volume 1, Issue 3**	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) **John Kardos; A. Coyne; Bryan Groves; Julio Franco; Nathan Freier**	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute,U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,22 Ashburn Drive, Upton Hall,Carlisle,PA,17013**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT **Approved for public release; distribution unlimited**

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

Welcome to this issue of the PKSOI Bulletin. Once again, we?re fortunate to have contributions from a number of talented professionals in the stability operations community of interest and/or practice. As a consequence, we have several articles enclosed in response to our theme: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations: Roles, Responsibilities, and Missions.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**Same as Report (SAR)**	**19**	

describes the U.S. Army's role and mission in Stability Operations. Colonel Bryan Groves provides a summary on the evolution of the Civil Affairs function in the U.S. Army and Commander Julio Franco of Argentina provides a case study of battalion-level peacekeeping skills as experienced in Haiti. Mr. Nate Freier gives us a preview of his research on the role of the Combatant Commands in this arena. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Linwood Ham argues for a stronger role for the National Security Council in reconstruction and stability operations planning, while the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization focuses on implementation and operations.

Mr. Richard Giero of the U.S. Army G3 provides an overview of the Montreaux Document, the first of its nature to codify the "rules" of private military security company engagement during peacekeeping and stability operations. Colonel Patrick Murray argues for the United Nations to reform and empower the Military Staff Committee to provide for better planning and execution of U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson Mendes of Brazil outlines for us the "metacompetencies" he believes are most relevant to leadership in complex environments, such as the multidimensional peacekeeping operation.

I encourage you to also check out our "PKSOI in the News" and "PKSOI in Action" sections, and the updated events calendar. As always, contact Colonel Lorelei Coplen at E-MAIL if you are interested in submitting an article for any future Bulletin or other PKSOI publications; or if you are interested in an Intern or Research Fellow position at PKSOI.

What do you think? Do you have something to say?
Something to add to our Event list?
The next bulletin topic will look at Landpower and
Stability Operations
Send your letter, or articles for submission to PKSOI Publications Coordinator @ E-MAIL; or through the "Contact Us" at the PKSOI Website no later than 1 June, 2009 for our next Bulletin. Provide sufficient contact information. Bulletin Editor may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only and in coordination with original author.

There is no suspense for submissions related to our Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Topic List. You may send your manuscript directly to the Chief, Policy and Knowledge Management Division, (PKM), PKSOI,

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Army Stability Operations Roles and Missions
by CPT A. Heather Coyne

Fitting the Army into a Whole of Government Approach to Stability Operations

This PKSOI Bulletin calls for all stakeholders to improve understanding of their part in the planning and execution of Stability Operations (SO). While understanding the Army roles and missions is essential, it is the interaction of the Army with other SO stakeholders that is the real key to success, and a far more complex undertaking. Army recognition that SO is a core element of its operational capability has emphasized the need to manage that interaction, and to integrate civilian and interagency expertise into military planning and operations. The challenge is finding the right architecture to plug civilian expertise into the Army, and vice versa. The ideal mechanism would enable the Army to take advantage of civilian capabilities and provide support to unleash their potential, without undermining their inherent strengths. The Army's efforts in this regard have precipitated procedural and structural changes throughout the force—though not always with the intended effect.

New Skillsets, New Mindsets

Strategic guidance directs DoD and the Army to place greater emphasis on SO through the development of new and improved capabilities, making SO a core military mission to be undertaken alone, if necessary, or in conjunction with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations. To support these requirements, the Army is making changes in doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities—known collectively as DOTMLPF—to ensure that SO is explicitly documented, addressed, and integrated into planning and operations. To oversee that process and ensure the Army is improving its capability and capacity to conduct SO, the Army created the Stability Operations Division in the Army Headquarters as the proponent for SO.

As detailed in the last PKSOI Bulletin, the Army is implementing its SO Action Plan, the keystone document that integrates SO policy, initiatives, and activities across the Army. That plan provides guidance to Army components on such things as increasing the number of personnel trained on non-lethal weapons, developing audit capabilities that support SO, instituting a system to track specialized civilian skills in the Reserve and National Guard, and training Army Chaplains to advise on local religious considerations. The sheer number of new activities and enhancements to existing capabilities required to conduct SO effectively could easily consume the Army's full attention.

However, the most critical change required by the Army in order to fulfill its roles and missions—and one that underlies virtually every task in the Action Plan— is a move towards integrated civil-military planning and action. Regardless of whether the Army is playing a leading role on the ground or supporting civilian agencies, it must have the ability to draw on and integrate civilian and interagency expertise into its planning and operations. This is the factor the Army must get right if any of its other SO activities are to succeed. Therefore, developing the architecture to support it—the mechanisms to "plug in" with interagency partners—has been the subject of intense debate and experimentation.

The importance of developing such an architecture for integrating civilian expertise into Army planning and operations is encapsulated in the recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM). The QRM, mandated by Congress, is a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the armed forces and the core competencies and capabilities of DoD to perform and support such roles and missions. It looks at gaps and duplications in DoD's ability to carry out the core missions and a plan for addressing them. The 2009 QRM dedicated significant attention to the necessity and opportunities for DoD to develop whole of government approaches to national security challenges, further validating the Army's efforts to reorient its processes and structures to better incorporate interagency perspectives.

Two ongoing efforts provide valuable insights on developing the architecture for integrating interagency expertise:

  ◊   Utilization of the Interagency Management System (IMS)

  ◊   Restructuring COCOMs for an Interagency Orientation

An alternative approach is to create an organic capacity for integrating civilian thinking in the Army as opposed to using interagency assets or when an interagency capability does not yet exist. An example of this approach is the Human Terrain System, which deploys teams of civilian social scientists to support tactical units. The Army will use the most appropriate model given the differing circumstances. However, in a time and resource constrained environment, it is likely that the Army will prefer to leverage the contributions of interagency partners, even if that makes for a more complicated and challenging dynamic.

The IMS and COCOM efforts demonstrate the Army and DoD's intention to change, and also highlight the challenges remaining to do so. Perhaps the most pressing of these for the future of SO is that these approaches have raised fundamental questions among SO practitioners in military, civilian, and non-governmental spheres about how to enhance integration without compromising the independence of civilian agencies or putting a "uniformed" face on American foreign policy. In addition, these experiments with integration suggest that core SO activities that have not yet adjusted to a whole-of-government approach may need to start considering the options to do so.

Utilization of the Interagency Management System

The QRM specifically references the effort to build an interagency planning framework to provide a prevention, response, and contingency capability to address foreign states at risk or experiencing the effects of instability, collapse, or post-conflict recovery. Led by the Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), this whole-of-government planning process is supported by the IMS. The IMS provides a structure for civilian planning and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. The IMS structure is also built to interface and integrate with existing military organizations when necessary.

The capacity for the IMS is provided by the DoS's Civilian Stabilization Initiative, within which the Civilian Response Corps serves as a pool of specialized, deployable staff for planning and operations.

Although IMS has not yet been implemented in full, a partial version of the system was applied during the response to the Georgian crisis last summer, and component parts of the IMS have been used to address conflicts in Haiti and Sudan. With respect to Georgia, S/CRS staff stood up a virtual Secretariat to serve as an interagency nexus with a mandate to ensure that all stakeholders were included in the decision making process.

This allowed for more effective dissemination of policy guidance to all relevant parties—from Washington to those on the ground in Georgia; early identification of gaps between policies and response activities; and improved accountability on task completion. Having a single entity in charge, with visibility across all stakeholder activities, and with the responsibility to ensure they were all represented, resulted in significant improvements. However, from an Army and DoD perspective, the IMS's impact was mostly limited to increasing situational awareness rather than taking a directive role in the response.

IMS's role continues to evolve and may become more directive in the future. For instance, in Afghanistan, civilian and military officials are using a system that resembles other components of the IMS to directly shape planning for civil-military activities on the ground.

The Army also hosts or participates in exercises and experiments that incorporate parts of the IMS. As reported in the last PKSOI Bulletin, Austere Challenge 2009 will integrate elements of the IMS including the use of an Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) to synch the Whole of Government Strategic Plan with military plans, and "deploying" an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) to support coordination between civilian and military elements on the ground. The IMS was used in Army Title 10 experiment Unified Action and USSOUTHCOM's Blue Advance exercise, both of which validated the importance of the system and contributed to further refinements.

While the IMS is relatively non-controversial as a concept, significant questions remain as to how it will be applied. Since the IMS was conceived as a response primarily for large-scale interventions, there are questions as to how the process can improve a whole-of-government approach to the global range of lower-level foreign assistance and stability operations. If the goal of SO is to unify strategies and leverage resources to prevent crises *before* they require large-scale intervention, IMS can be more responsive if it is not reserved only for major contingencies. In terms of the Army's role in IMS, neither it nor DOD more widely has institutionalized how to plug into IMS, so each iteration is handled independently without building staff expertise or institutional memory on the military side.

A partial answer to these concerns is offered by the modular nature of the IMS process, which has allowed the experimentation described above. The procedures and tools available to the IMS can be tailored and applied successfully to selected activities, without requiring a full launch of the system. IMS experiments have raised awareness of the new tools and have elicited a generally positive response. Most importantly, they have generated buy-in from senior military and civilian leadership that can help address institutionalization issues.

The IMS systems are gradually earning acceptance as a way to manage interagency collaboration for SO, and—in their modular form—may become a more common phenomenon on 21st century conflict. In the meantime, testing and validation of the whole IMS system, including aspects that have not yet been implemented in a real-world contingency, would increase familiarity with and confidence in the system.

Restructuring COCOMs for an Interagency Orientation

The Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are also developing approaches to integrating interagency expertise. This effort, while not driven solely by the Army, has important implications for the interaction of Army forces in theater with interagency partners. All COCOMs have designated staff with a responsibility to coordinate plans and activities with interagency partners; SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have adopted innovative organizational approaches to maximize integration of interagency partners. DoD will assess the improvements of these reorganizations and their associated interagency cooperation mechanisms for applicability to other COCOMs, but an early look at the impacts suggest that the organizational changes have started institutionalizing a forward-leaning mindset on interagency collaboration.

DoD can capitalize on these experiments if it recognizes their strengths and weaknesses.

SOUTHCOM recognized that it needed to become a more interagency-oriented organization in order to meet security challenges that cross the traditional roles of US Government (USG) agencies. The new structure is designed to facilitate collaboration with other USG departments and agencies, and with partner nations in the region. It provides for extensive inclusion of interagency staff and has a DoS civilian serving as one of two deputies to the Commander. SOUTHCOM is structured by function, with a Stability Directorate responsible for activities that build partner nations' capacity and integrates security cooperation projects with interagency partners. The Command hosts the Interagency Coordination Group meetings which address specific issues, activities, and missions that are of mutual interest in the western hemisphere. SOUTHCOM also sponsors senior-level meetings co-hosted by the Commander and lead federal agency counterparts to address specific issues and inform senior interagency leadership on the results of collaborative efforts or exercises. Interagency partners helped to shape the Theater Campaign Plan, allowing planners to better identify needed interagency support and more broadly, enabling cultural change in the Command to work more effectively with these partners.

AFRICOM was created specifically with the non-traditional security threats in mind, and therefore a structure to facilitate partnerships with civilian organizations was a high priority from the start. Similar to that of SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM's new organizational structure was designed to integrate the expertise and unique perspective of interagency personnel. One of the two deputies is a DoS civilian, and nine USG agencies have provided individuals on a permanent or temporary basis to serve at AFRICOM headquarters. Command plans, programs, and standard operating procedures benefit from interagency peer review and interagency experts were involved in the development of AFRICOM's Theater Campaign Plan.

While there is widespread recognition throughout USG that integrating the interagency into the COCOM structure facilitates a more holistic USG approach, these moves have raised concern among some non-governmental organizations and even within civilian agencies that the relatively massive COCOMs will dominate and militarize American foreign policy in these regions.

DoD has worked to counter these suspicions and reassure USG and non-governmental partners that AFRICOM will remain focused on building capacity of African security organizations and will play a supporting role to US embassies in the region. In the continuing quest for a whole of government approach, it will be essential to balance enhanced collaboration against maintaining appropriate levels of independence of the relevant players. It is also important to consider that the way a new integration concept is introduced and marketed will have a major impact on its success in getting support from its intended partners.

Conclusion

Nothing in the Army's roles and missions for SO is as challenging as the need to integrate civilian and interagency expertise into planning and operations, and that integration is critical to the Army's capacity to fulfill almost all of its other missions. A growing realization of this fact has led to the introduction of changes in processes and structures, using a variety of approaches to develop the architecture for integrating civilian expertise into planning and operations. The new mechanisms are still immature, relationships between new structures and processes (such as reorganized COCOMs and IMS) have not yet been worked out, and they often have unexpected and unintended consequences, but they are increasingly the order of the day for SO.

The next step is for the Army to educate and train its force to use these systems effectively, something that will only come with practice.

Those responsible for writing syllabi, training personnel, and developing exercises should find ways to incorporate the new models so that they do not remain isolated experiments, but become vehicles to transform the Army's new mindset on SO into action.

Finally, numerous Army activities remain that have not yet integrated robust interagency collaboration mechanisms, including some that are central to the SO mission, such as Security Force Assistance and Irregular Warfare. The Army will continue making adjustments across the DOTMLPF domains in order to function in a whole-of-government environment and would be well-advised to consider the challenges posed by earlier approaches.

CPT A. Heather Coyne *is assigned as an IMA Reservist to the Stability Operations Division of HQDA G3/5/7. As a civilian, she works for the US Institute of Peace where she was the chief of party for the Institute's activities in Iraq in 2003-2005. She previously served fifteen months in Iraq as a U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs officer, assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority as the civil society officer for the Baghdad region.* E-MAIL

PKSOI Website Re-released

After several months of design, planning and building, PKSOI re-released its website with a new look, and updated content and graphics on March 16, 2009. The site contains several new features such as a Publications page showcasing PKSOI products, Biography page that provides credentials for our experts, PKSOI Bulletin Archive page, Mission Brief page and a online Request for Information form just to name a few. PKSOI is committed to updating the website frequently and is always on the lookout for new content that empowers the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations community of practice. We encourage you to please check out the re-released site at: https://pksoi.army.mil/

Why Civil Affairs?

by COL Bryan Groves

The mission of CA forces is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning Civil Affairs operations in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations to support commanders in en-gaging the civil component of their operational environment, in order to enhance civil-military operations or other stated U.S. objectives before, during, or after other military operations.

Army FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, September 2006

Although the U. S. Army has not always had a Civil Affairs (CA) branch, it has always had a Civil Affairs mission. The CA branch is more important today, as it remains the Army's only branch devoted to engaging and influencing foreign civilian populations. It is greatly assisted by Psychological Operations in this effort, as well as every deployed Soldier, Airman, Marine or Sailor in their daily contact with civilians. The Civil Affairs mission is a non-kinetic, smart-power mission that the Army must accomplish in order to satisfactorily meet its obligations under international law and to address all three elements of Clausewitz's "wonderful trinity."[1]

Some History:

Smart commanders have always understood the importance of conducting Civil Affairs, commonly in the form of military government. General Winfield Scott's conduct of stability operations during our war with Mexico is a prime example. Observing what went wrong for Napoleon during his attempt to occupy Spain (and probably for Zachary Taylor, whose ill-disciplined troops quickly wore out the welcome initially given them by Mexican citizens), Scott published his General Order No. 20, outlining standards of behavior for soldiers and civilians and subjected all to trial by courts-martial.[2] Scott offered carrots with sticks, and created a public works program that employed Mexican manpower in major public sanitation efforts that benefited U.S. military and Mexican civilians alike.

Scott's General Order 20 later gave birth to President Lincoln's General Order 100, which was intended to prevent civil animosity after the fighting stopped and the United States were reunited. We would use General Order 100 again during our occupation of the Philippines, and it would later become the basis for much of the Geneva and Hague Conventions.[3] What is particularly interesting about General Order 100 is that it reflects far more than a will to "support commanders," or the need to address civilian concerns out of military necessity. It reflects the moral convictions of its authors:

> As martial law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity – virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.[4]

Brigadier General MacArthur used General Order 100 in the Philippines over thirty years later. However, it was applied unevenly by various commanders and staff with no uniform training in military government, civil administration or other aspects of Civil Affairs. Ultimately, some commanders excelled in the conduct of Civil Affairs, while some commanders were court-martialed. Ordering Soldiers to turn the countryside "into a howling wilderness" or "shoot any boys over ten years of age" was not in the spirit of General Order 100. Though incidents like these were the exception and not the rule, they sold a lot of news copy and did not endear the Army to the greater American (or Philippine) public.

The Army would not establish formal education for Civil Affairs and Military Government until World War II, when the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major General Allen W. Gullion, was designated the Provost Marshall General and given the mission to build schools for Military Police and Military Government. The first school of Military Government opened on the campus of the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. As the Army saw the need for more Civil Affairs officers, it opened additional schools at other civilian universities to meet the demand.

In 1946, a School of Military Government opened at Carlisle Barracks to train additional officers for occupation duty. Many officers received training in German or Japanese according to the theater they were to be assigned to. The thorough preparation of plans for post-war occupation and the extensive training that some Civil Affairs officers who helped implement those plans received were key to Germany and Japan developing into powerful, yet peaceful allies that supported us through the Cold War and the War on Terror. During our wars in Korea and Vietnam, the Army did not conduct military government or serve as an occupying power as legally understood. Instead, we supported existing governments such as the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam.

Regardless of government structure, Civil Affairs was still vital to mission success. In his report of Army Civil Affairs in Korea, Henry Kissinger noted that:

> . . . the first civil affairs efforts were in the fields of public health, welfare, and sanitation, for the purpose of preventing disease, starvation, and unrest. In the winter of 1950-51, the movement of several million refugees threatened interference with the use of vital communication lines. Later still, removal of civilians from combat areas and their subsequent care and disposition were deemed necessary, not only for humanitarian reasons, but as a security measure as well.[5]

The Army never employed more than 400 Civil Affairs officers and Soldiers in Korea, and just as Task Force Smith was not prepared for their ordeal at Osan, these officers did not come with the extensive preparation and language training that their World War II predecessors had. They did have a basic idea of their roles in the fight and achieved

minimal success, working through the Republic of Korea government:

> . . . the doctrine of "military necessity" was also invoked by tactical commanders in assuming directive powers over civil affairs functions from corps areas forward. The evacuation of refugees, the distribution of relief supplies, and various security measures were carried out by ROK authorities, wherever possible, but at the direction of the tactical commander. Finally, the ROK authorities were responsible for the distribution of relief supplies and other measures to prevent disease and unrest, subject only to the "advice and assistance" of US or UN agencies.[6]

The U.S. Army would use the same strategy in OEF and OIF. We avoided the "O-word" (occupation) as much as possible and quickly identified legitimate local government structures to support. In Iraq, we rapidly fielded government support teams (GSTs) staffed primarily by Reserve Component Civil Affairs Soldiers and officers but often lead by a Department of State officer. These GSTs did not govern the provinces, but they ensured they received the funding they needed from Baghdad and gave them heavy direction and assistance. While the GST concentrated on helping local Iraqis improve governance, Reserve Component Army Engineer Groups and United States Army Corps of Engineer (USACE) civilians organized in Forward Engineers Support Teams (FESTs) helped rebuild Iraqi infrastructure that had crumbled due to neglect and UN sanctions. These GSTs would soon morph into provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), based on a successful model for integrating U.S. military and civilian expertise to help expand the power of the government of Afghanistan outwards from Kabul.

This shift in our Civil Affairs doctrine, from Military Government to government "by, through and with" a supported host nation reflects the realities of a resource-constrained U. S. Army that lacks sufficient personnel trained in all the intricacies of public service to actually govern large occupied spaces. This shift also supports U.S. National Security Strategies based on spreading and supporting democracy. U.S. military governments imposed by occupying powers, even with the best of intent, are far easier targets for enemy propaganda than host nation governments supported by U.S. military and civilians.

Over 100,000 North Korean civilians were evacuated by sea in December 1950 as United Nations Forces withdrew in the face of Communist Chinese Forces and North Korean People's Army. Seattle Post Intelligencer, January, 1951.

The role of Civil Affairs in Stability Operations:

Currently, the U.S. Army assigns Civil Affairs five core tasks: Populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), civil information management (CIM), and support to civil administration (SCA). While these are tasks not just for Civil Affairs forces, but for all forces, Civil Affairs officers most often plan them.

A brief description of the core tasks follows:

- PRC involves curfews, rationing programs, separating the guerilla fish from the civilian populace sea in counterinsurgency (COIN).

- FHA involves delivering humanitarian assistance to foreign populations affected by manmade or natural disasters.

- NA consists of CA and other military forces identifying material and human resources in foreign countries that can be used to support our deployed military. CIM describes the Army's desire to develop a "Common Operating Picture" of the civilian environment that in a perfect world will be shared with the non-governmental organization (NGO) community and various helping agencies of the UN to assist with delivery of humanitarian assistance and promote reconstruction and development.

- SCA best describes what our CA forces are currently doing in OEF and OIF.

Within the construct of Stability Operations (SO), as defined in the newly published FM 3-07, Stability Operations, the Army establishes for itself five tasks specific to SO: Establish Civil Security, Establish Civil Control, Restore Essential Services, Support to Governance, and Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development. These tasks are nested into the State Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (SCRS) technical sectors they support. Army Civil Affairs plays a significant role in all of these tasks. Here are just a few examples:

In establishing Civil Security in support of the Security sector, Civil Affairs functional specialists have assisted in standing up police academies in Kosovo and Iraq and helped mentor, clothe and equip civilian police as well.

In Justice and Reconciliation sector, (task: Establish Civil Control), CA teams conducted censuses of foreign prisons, helped train and equip new judiciaries, and helped repair prisons and detention facilities and bring them up to international standards.

In regards to the SO task, Restore Essential Services, which nests into Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being, CA teams have helped repair water treatment and sewage treatment plants, civilian telephone networks, health clinics and schools.

For the Governance and Participation sector (task: Support Governance), Civil Affairs units have helped organize women's groups, inspect prisons and jails for possible human rights abuses, and assisted in planning and supervising voter registration and the conduct of elections.   They have helped fund the repair of civilian radio and television broadcast stations and train foreign journalists about their newly won freedom of the press and the responsibility to report accurately and objectively that comes with that freedom.

2-2. An integrated approach to stability operations

In the Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure sector, Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development task, Civil Affairs units at the tactical level have connected local suppliers with coalition military to provide markets for their goods and services, creating local jobs and local reasons to support coalition military presence. At the operational level, CA forces helped issue new currencies in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is important to note that the majority of these CA-supported SO tasks are conducted overwhelmingly with the Citizen-Soldiers of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), the most deployed Reserve Component soldiers in the Army. The U.S. Army is building additional Active Component CA capacity to relieve the pressure on these Reservists, but it will still rely heavily on the Reserve Component for the expertise in the fourteen functions currently recognized in our doctrine (Public Administration, Environmental Management, Public Safety, Economic Development, Food and Agriculture, Civil Supply, Public Works and Utilities, Public Transportation, Public Communications, Public Health, Cultural Relations, Public Education, Civil Information, and International Law.)

Regardless of force structure, the work of CA soldiers, and all other soldiers supporting CA and SO tasks, is essential to the U.S. Army's and America's success in ongoing overseas contingency operations and civil-military engagements because they contribute directly to winning the cooperation of the local civilian populace in those areas where we are deployed and in helping us secure the moral high ground we all jealously guard. Ensuring the proper manning, education and training of both reserve and active component Civil Affairs units must be a priority for our Army.

[1]Clausewitz described a trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. Carl Von Clausewitz, ON WAR, translated by Howard and Paret, 1976, Princeton University Press, Princeton, Page 89.
[2]Colonel Timothy A. Jones, MILITARY PROCONSULS: THE ARMY AND ITS ROLE IN MILITARY GOVERNANCE, March, 2007, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, page 3.
[3]Jones, page 4.
[4]U.S. War Department, The 1863 Laws of War (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005), 34.
[5]Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-1951, Henry A. Kissinger, C. Darwin Stolzenbach, 12 May 1952, Operations Research Office, John Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland, page 14.
[6]Kissinger, page 17

COL Bryan Groves became Chief, Civil-Military Integration at PKSOI in July, 2008. Bryan worked with United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and various UN agencies during two tours in Kosovo as a member of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) Civil Affairs Staff and later as commander, 443rd Civil Affairs Battalion. He served in Iraq with the 304th Civil Affairs Brigade in support of the 1st Marine Division and the 82nd Airborne Division, where he

worked with the Civilian Provisional Authority to help equip Iraqi Security Forces and fund repairs to public infrastructure. E-MAIL

Intelligence in Peace Missions:

The Argentine Experience in Haiti
by CDR Julio Franco

CDR Julio Franco describes the value of properly conducted security-related intelligence activities to the ultimate success of peace enforcement missions, using the experience of Argentinean forces in Haiti. Chronicling the work of the Intelligence Group of the Argentine Joint Battalion, the author highlights that understanding the people's attitudes and political environment, through evaluation and assessment of predominately open sources, facilitates mission objectives in both short- and long-term. In addition, such matters as culture, character, history, and values--whether revered or disparaged by the local populations--can also be determined through prudent observations. In this Haitian case study of the Argentine battalion, the interaction with the people was instrumental in the deterrence of the armed gangs by providing the information needed to conduct appropriate psychological operations.

For full article in the original language, see Inteligencia en Misiones de Paz. For English translation go here

CDR Julio Franco joined PKSOI as an International Fellow from the Argentinean armed forces in September 2008, directly from service as the UN instructor in CAECOPAZ (Argentinean Joint Peacekeeping Operations Training Center). He is a naval infantry officer (equivalent to the US Marine Corps) with 25 years of experience in amphibious and light infantry units. From 2006 – 2007, he was deputy of the Joint Argentine Battalion Light Battalion in Gonaives, Haiti. E-MAIL

A PKSOI Quick Look Assessment

Regional Security and Development Zones:

A Top-Down Option for Addressing the Civil-Military Imbalance

by Mr. Nathan Freier

Wither the Combatant Command?

Department of Defense (DOD) senior leaders are vocal advocates for rebalancing the instruments of national power and migrating authority and responsibility for foreign and security policy execution away from DOD. This will not occur, however, without a meaningful, high-level reexamination of the combatant commands (COCOMs) and their relationship to other U.S. government (USG) agencies. In practice, an essential first step in righting the imbalance between instruments relies on fundamental changes to the USG civil-military dynamic around the world. The USG must find alternatives to regional CO-COM primacy.

Ultimately, rebalancing will require a thorough assessment involving all of the key executive departments. It will also ultimately require new legislative mandates codifying a more appropriate and rebalanced civil-military relationship. Near-term steps to begin rebalancing are possible. Change should not wait on universal solutions.

This short article offers preliminary insights on how the USG might begin effectively rebalancing the nation's instruments of power from the top down through a deliberate and ambitious restructuring in three specific regions — North and South America and Africa. In these three regions, the new administration — through the current Unified Command Plan (UCP) review and the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) — can deliberately lower the military profile and migrate policy primacy back in favor of civil authorities at very low levels of institutional and strategic risk. All three are uniquely suited to near-term adjustment.

To begin this process, two steps are particularly important. First, the USG should charter a whole-of-government review of theater-strategic and operational-level policy planning and execution.

This includes a detailed look at DOD's Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the COCOMs impact on USG policy implementation at the theater level.

In point of fact, DOD cannot continue to complain about gaps in effective civilian leadership and capability without accepting that fixing these gaps will require materiel reductions in explicit and implicit military authority and influence. Furthermore, it must recognize that all theater-level USG endeavors — including warfighting — require the seamless integration of the interagency (IA) from the beginning. From a DOD perspective, the 2012 UCP is a reasonable target for implementation of a worldwide rebalancing of policy instruments. This gives the current national security team time to carefully examine various options and adopt the best course of action.

As for the second step, the USG should initiate low-risk, revolutionary rebalancing now in specific regions as a proof of principle. This would lay a firm foundation for more wide-ranging future change. Today, there is significant light but less heat associated with the rebalancing debate. At a minimum, defense and national security officials appear to be committed to rebalancing "deployed" instruments of power through a deliberate redistribution of national security "wealth." However, generalized increases in IA resources are only part of the answer.

Indeed, a tangible down-payment on appropriately reordering foreign and security policy primacy would include moves now to attack the civil-military imbalance in regions where it is most acute. The prospect for reexamining the primacy of COCOMs, as well as the necessity for some low-risk, near-term change in COCOM structures, both were raised in a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report — *Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives: An Assessment of Key 2001-2008 Defense Reforms.* Others — in and out of uniform — have recently made equally thoughtful and compelling arguments on the subject.

[Go to complete article with notes]

Nathan Freier joined PKSOI as a Visiting Research Professor in August 2008. He is also a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He joined CSIS in April of 2008 after a 20-year career as a field artillery officer and strategist in the United States Army
E-MAIL

NSC Directorate for Nation Building—Good News for S/CRS

By LTC Linwood Ham

On February 8, 2009, the *Washington Post* reported that President Obama's impending directive on the National Security Council (NSC) establishes a directorate for Nation Building. If he makes such a decision, the NSC staff should define the portfolio of this new directorate to assume all strategic planning, decision making, and assessing of stabilization and reconstruction activities heretofore supervised by the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Created in July 2004, in the wake of the Coalition Provincial Authority experience in Iraq, S/CRS has become the face of U.S. civilian response for global stabilization and reconstruction requirements. In National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, then President George W. Bush identified S/CRS as the lead entity for U.S. planning, implementation and execution for a civilian response to complex crises. If the goal of the Obama Administration's NSC directive is to centralize national security functions, then a related review is needed to identify the tasks S/CRS should no longer perform.

The challenges recognized as inherent with Nation Building—or Stability and Reconstruction—are not new to the U.S. government. President William Clinton addressed the phenomenon of "complex contingencies" in his second term in respect to the same or similar issues. With the promulgation of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," the Clinton Administration sought to reorient the NSC staff and provide direction to U.S. agencies regarding how the United States would organize national resources to address peace operations. PDD-56 cited the experiences in Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and Yugoslavia as reasons to direct the national security agencies to approach such missions in a fundamentally different way. PDD-56 established an Executive Committee (commonly referred to as the ExCom) to assist the Deputies Committee and to achieve greater civilian and military synchronization of efforts during a complex contingency. The PDD-56 also established a "political-military implementation plan" as the synchronizing tool for all U.S. agency actions during such contingencies. The two immediate challenges inherent to this PDD were the potential supervision of multiple ExComs operating in order to achieve the "day-to-day management" goal as outlined in the directive, and the gaining of full agency conformity through complex contingency planning when the culture of planning was non-existent in most civilian agencies.

PDD-56, in essence, created an ad-hoc system for managing complex contingencies, with an ExCom established for each discreet event. Multiple ExComs still vied for Deputies' attention and duplicated the work of standing regional directorates. The political-military implementation plan placed a heavy emphasis on the diplomatic and military instruments of power, despite acknowledging the contingency mission may require skillful implementation of many other U.S. government agencies whose capabilities (e.g. development, financial, judicial, law enforcement) may be critical to success of the activity. Despite this criticism, the political-military implementation plan model was a significant first step toward identifying and addressing the myriad challenges within a complex contingency. Sadly, this is the proverbial cart in need of a horse. The horse should have been a strategic plan that clearly expressed the policy and strategic goals to be achieved through participation in a complex contingency. Without such a document, the ExComs lacked strategic vision from which to craft a comprehensive, and workable, implementation plan.

President George W. Bush published National Security Presidential Directive 1 in February 2001, restructuring, yet again, the National Security Council and interagency processes. One of the first reorganization actions listed was the dissolution of Clinton Administration interagency working groups (IWGs), which included ExComs. NSPD-1 instructed the regional NSC Policy Coordination Committees to assume the management of any ongoing contingency missions. This decision remedied the problem of ad-hoc ExComs but saddled the regional directorates with managing complex contingencies and the inherent multifunctional activities, as well as supervising normal regional policy issues. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom again tested the limits of post-conflict policymaking, strategic planning, and integration across the U.S. government. In testimony before the Senate in March 2004, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) President John Hamre endorsed legislation calling for the creation of a "Directorate for Stabilization and Reconstruction Activities," to provide the NSC system with a permanent, enduring capability for creating and managing post-conflict policy. Such a move would have institutionalized stabilization policy within the NSC structure. Instead, the Bush Administration, with the publication of NSPD 44, formalized the ExCom system of the Clinton Administration with the creation of the Department of State Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). NSPD 44 designated the Secretary of State to "coordinate and lead" U.S. reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) efforts and authorized S/CRS to assist the Secretary of State to develop and

approve R&S strategies, coordinate the efforts of all U.S. government agencies and international governments or organizations, develop partner security capabilities, lead U.S. development of a civilian response capacity, assess progress and capture lessons learned, and resolve policy or program disputes among the various stakeholders. NSPD 44 marks a greater understanding of the enormity of such operations, and the creation of a standing office is a significant improvement to the ad-hoc nature of an ExCom. The decision to establish a reconstruction and stabilization office within an agency, however, rather than within the NSC structure, reduced the ability to reach the important goals of intergovernmental collaboration toward a particular U.S. stabilization and reconstruction mission. Moreover, State had to staff the office with Foreign Service officers with years of diplomatic experience and transform them into strategic and operational stabilization/reconstruction strategists, planners, executors, and managers with little training or education in these new tasks. These two requirements are obstacles to establishing a full-up intergovernmental capability to provide a civilian response to the R&S situations. NSPD 44 also called for the creation of a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), a Policy Coordination Committee-like entity, co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a member of the NSC staff. In addition, the Department of State regional bureau will typically seek a significant role in the CRSG. This leads to an indelicate parsing of policy responsibilities among three distinct organizations rather than one entity leading the policymaking, policy implementation, and policy assessment activities for the NSC system. Moreover, the NSC system was designed for optimal congruence on policy matters where the NSC staff leads, facilitates, and coordinates policy efforts, to include the identification of roles for agencies and the resolution of policy disputes among agencies. NSPD 44 weakened the CRSG by creating two to three "leads" on the matter of complex contingency policy.

Since its creation in 2004, S/CRS has developed a vast capacity for reconstruction and stabilization implementation planning. The staff includes, and partners with, representatives of all of the Executive Departments, to include the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which have years of practical experience with such activities. Together, the S/CRS has developed methods for expressing how U.S. government civilian capacity can be marshaled in response to, or to prevent, an instability situation that threatens U.S. interests and made significant advancements in three key components to reconstruction and stabilization policy implementation. The first component is a comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction management scheme, the Interagency Management System (IMS),

which organizes the process and civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction activities to take place at the strategic or policy level, implementation or operational level, and field or tactical level.[6] IMS is an important innovation in controlling R&S activities at all levels. The second S/CRS-developed component is a stability analysis tool, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) that allows agencies to contemplate stability environments and establish a common understanding of the factors that could lead to or have contributed to instability.[7] The third component is a structure for continued civilian-military coordination. In support of this structure, DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, commits Defense elements to support U.S. government civilian efforts in leading such operations or complementing U.S. military SSTR actions.[8] Through IMS, S/CRS established a common operational planning framework for civilian action and a civilian agency planning cell for combatant commands (COCOMs), providing civilian agencies a planning tool and operational planning staff that complements COCOM contingency planning.

More recently S/CRS has assumed the responsibility for the management of civilian response. Secretary Rice inaugurated the Civilian Response Corps in July 2008, which is comprised of active, standby, and reserve components of federal/state/local government employees or private sector individuals who can provide a tailored and sustained civilian response to a stabilization or reconstruction situation.[9] S/CRS employs a quarter of its 108 person staff on the supervision of CRC activities, as well as nearly a third of the staff on stabilization and reconstruction planning matters. With the addition of staff dedicated to conflict prevention activities, and one quickly understands that the S/CRS plate is overflowing with implementation and field activities. It makes sense to relieve the burden of leading policy committees and strategic planning activities.

In summary, since the end of the Cold War, two successive U.S. government administrations advanced the notion of instability as a direct threat to U.S. interests and national security. Both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations sought to rationalize how their NSC systems would manage the U.S. response to such missions. An enduring lesson learned has been the need to not only direct such commitment of U.S. national power at the highest level of our national security system, but also to maintain an office that has the weight and backing of the White House to reach across agency boundaries in the crafting of true whole-of-government responses to stabilization and reconstruction challenges.

R&S requirements stretch the ability of any one agency to lead strategy, implementation, and execution efforts. The Project on National Security Reform report, "Forging a New Shield," criticized the S/CRS for deriving its power through "advocacy and persuasion" and being powerless to compel agency complicity in R&S activities, a crippling assessment given the vast amount of tasks it must fulfill under NSPD44.[10] The "three Ds" of diplomacy, development, and defense are necessary components to nation building, but require the full scope of national capabilities. DoS, DoD, and USAID would be well served by a reformed national security system where the NSC staff forges, manages, and assesses nation building policy and leads the formulation of whole-of-government strategies that address future stabilization and reconstruction activities. S/CRS has blazed a vast trail with the close collaboration of DoD and USAID and, with an NSC directorate for Nation Building solely responsible for NSC system activities, can deepen this interagency partnership and expand on the important work initiated with other civilian agencies, combatant commands, embassies, and fielded military forces to implement and execute R&S tasks.

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Strategic Partners for Health Care Stability and Reconstruction Operations

by CDR Bruno Himmler

While currently serving as the Health and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, I am often asked to describe or define key partners who play active roles in economic development and reconstruction regarding the health sector. Consequently, I developed this overview of some of the health care organizations in which we regularly coordinate and correspond. This list is by no means all-inclusive of the plethora of motivated and inspired agents and agencies that conduct operations in support of the many worthy causes world-wide. Instead, it is a small representation of the larger or better-known among the International Organizations (IO), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and Governmental Organizations (GO).

Included in the complete article are each organization's charter, mission statement, priorities or guiding principles as well as their primary funding sources and web site. Please contact me at E-MAIL to be added to our list .

[Go to complete article with notes]

Commander Bruno Himmler is a member of the active component of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) and currently serves as the Health and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor for PKSOI at the U.S. Army War College. Previously, he served three years with the U.S. Navy as a Medical Officer and one year in Iraq as the Health Attaché in Baghdad. During his initial four years with Health and Human Services (HHS), he has primarily focused on Native American Health Services in Idaho. He also served on two deployments in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) in Stability Operations (SO):

An Examination of the Montreux Document Implications to U.S. Army SO

by Mr. Richard Giero

The increasing—and sometimes controversial—use of private military security companies (PMSC) by non-military government or non-government organizations (NGO) or agencies identified a "gap" in contemporary international agreements regarding the use of security protection forces that are neither military nor civil. Therefore, U.S. government (USG) representatives joined representatives of 16 other nations (see note next page) and the International Red Cross (IRC) in Montreux, Switzerland, in order to discuss the proposed rules and "best practices" in utilization, planning, selection and hiring of private military and security companies. The result of these discussions is the Montreux Document of 17 September 2008.

The Montreux Document highlights several key points that facilitate a common understanding among the participating nations. Part One of this document distinguishes between the three major entities or "States" concerned with employing PMSCs: contracting States; territorial States; and home States. Contracting States, as expected, directly contract for the PMSC services. Territorial States define the host nation where the PMSC will operate. Finally, Home States are the State in which the PMSCs' are headquartered, incorporated or registered. As an example, State A may be the incorporating headquarters for a PMSC which is operating inside the territory of State B at the behest of State C's contracts with the PMSC headquarters.

Further discussion in Part One includes each State's obligations and responsibilities as well as those of the PMSC and its personnel in adhering to international laws and agreements when hiring PMSCs or working on behalf of a State and other legal entities.

Part Two of the document informs and assists national government entities, international government organizations (IGOs), NGOs, and/or multinational corporations that employ PMSCs—as well as the PMSC itself—by providing a list of 73 "rules and good practices" designed to assist in the selection, management, assessment, and evaluation of PMSCs.

The rules and good practices provide a useful guide for States which have or anticipate having PMSCs operating within their territories, and are encouraged to consider these good practices in defining their relationships with PMSCs.

Although the Montreux Document is not legally binding, it does present pertinent international law, human rights law, and the States' legal obligations to uphold these laws for the employment of PMSCs.

The 73 rules and good practices described in the Montreux Document are first arranged according to the type of State concerned—contracting, territorial, or home—and secondly, into these sub-sections:

1. Determination of services
2. Procedures for the selection and contracting of PMSCs
3. Criteria for the selection of PMSCs
4. Terms of the Contract with PMSCs
5. Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability
6. Terms of authorization (Territorial State and Home State)
7. Rules on the provision of services by PMSCs and their personnel

These rules and good practices not only help all parties concerned with the employment of PMSCs, but also non-concerned parties which come in contact with members of a PMSC. The good practices provide the means by which the civilian populace is informed about the rules of conduct which the PMSC must abide by and provides available complaint mechanisms if they don't. These good practices explain how a PMSC must be afforded a fair opportunity to respond to allegations from all parties concerning suspected violation of the terms of their authorization. If found in violation, administrative measures to reprimand the PMSC include loss of contract, compensation to the injured parties, prohibition to re-apply for authorization, forfeiture of bonds or securities and other financial penalties. Ultimately, these rules and good practices should be used to promote only PMSCs that respect international law and human rights law by ensuring appropriate training, internal procedures and supervision when providing security services in conflict and non-conflict environments.

The Montreux Document has implications for the U.S. Army during SO for several reasons:

1. It increases USG—and, therefore, U.S. Army—understanding of rules of international law concerning PMSCs and their relationship with the Host Nation (HN) and USG agencies which employ PMSCs

while operating in permissive and non-permissive environments during periods of armed conflict, civil unrest, or relative calm.

2. It provides guidelines for the USG on the selection, management, assessment, and evaluation of PMSCs hired in support of U.S. Army SO.

3. It provides recommended actions the USG and the U.S. Army can take in support of the host nation if USG-hired or other PMSCs violate international humanitarian law, human rights law or national law during SO.

4. It is of practical value with regard to Security Force Assistance (SFA), as PMSCs would likely serve as trainers of FSF, in lieu of FSF, or as personal security for FSF, ministerial leaders, or other organizations supporting FSF, and therefore most-likely under the purview of the U.S. Army prior to transition to civil authorities.

5. It is of specific value because it addresses areas where the U.S. Army has had difficulties in the current operating environment, such as:

   a. Weapons authorization and accountability for the PMSC (e.g., a PMSC must carry authorization documents to possess weapons, and cannot exceed their authorized caliber).

   b. Reporting of human rights violations by the PMSC (e.g., a PMSC must report any incidence causing injury of civilian personnel or damage to property during conduct of operations).

   c. Training standards and proficiency of the PMSC (e.g., a PMSC must understand and adhere to established theater Rules of Engagement).

For more information about The Montreux Document, see [Go to Montreux Document]

(note: The signatures of this document are: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, and the United States of America.)

Mr. Richard Giero is currently assigned at the Civil-Military Integration Branch of the U.S. Army G3, Stability and Security Operations. He is a subject expert in Civil-Military Relations during Irregular Warfare with several years in Iraq, Sudan and Bosnia. He can be reached at E-MAIL

Strategic Leadership Competencies for Peacekeeping Operations

by LTC Wilson Mendes Lauria

For peacekeeping to accomplish its mission, as the United Nations has discovered repeatedly over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force. However, force alone cannot create peace; it can only create a space in which peace can be built.[1] United Nations. General Assembly and Security Council

In 2000, motivated by peacekeeping disasters in Bosnia (1992), Somalia (1993), and Rwanda (1994), and their negative impacts on the Member States, the United Nations (UN) established a high-level panel to review the United Nations peace activities. The intention of this panel was: (a) to identify the reasons behind the failures; and (b) to propose a clear set of practical recommendations to avoid similar problems. The final report of this panel – commonly referred to as the *Brahimi Report* - had a profound effect on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) because the Report clearly recognized that the peacekeeping environment had changed. As a result, the UN developed a new and complex body of principles and guidelines. The epigraph above synthesizes the role of the peacekeeping operation (PKO) inside of the current multifaceted environment. The *Brahimi Report* describes the demarcation line between the Traditional and the Multidimensional PKO.

The purpose of this paper is to answer the following question: which are the most relevant competencies for a strategic leader in charge of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation? To address this question, I contrast the contemporary PKO environment with the strategic leadership metacompetencies proposed by Leonard Wong in *Strategic Leadership Competencies*. My choice for Wong was not aleatory. I assert the metacompetencies` approach overcomes the others because it provides the most comprehensive approach. For Wong, the concept behind the labels, not the labels themselves, are the focal points for leader development and assessment. [Go to complete article with notes]

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson Mendes Lauria is a Cavalry officer of the Brazilian Army currently serving as an International Fellow of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2009. He conducts research in Peacekeeping Operations, Expeditionary Operations, and Force Design. E-MAIL

New at PKSOI...

STABILITY OPERATIONS LESSONS LEARNED

PKSOI's Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS) continues to grow and expand its reach to the Peace and Stability Operations community. The SOLLIMS "constellation" of peace centers and partners now includes the International Forum for the Challenges on Peace Operations (CHALLENGES), the Argentinean Peace Centre (CAECOPAZ), and PK Americas. SOLLIMS will also be used to support PKSOI's lessons collection, analysis and issue resolution coming from the Austere Challenge 09 exercise in April 09. US Army SETAF is also sponsoring a sub-site within SOLLIMS that will be available to support lessons learned efforts and the sharing of emerging insights from the US Army Africa region. PKSOI also continues to work with the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) and the S/CRS Best Practices Working Group to refine the Interagency Lessons Learned process and "hub" operations.

SOLLIMS is Password and I/D protected to control user access / membership by appropriate representatives of the P/SO community. Recommend all our readers get up online, register and visit the various sub-sites. We are also always looking for contributions to the growing database of Observations, Insights and Lessons – your experiences and expertise can make a difference – please join the team, make a contribution and help us improve the site's value-added to the Peace and Stability Operations community.

SOLLIMS
Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System

Click on logo above to go to site and register for access.

PKSOI 2009 Research and Topic List

PKSOI supports the peace and stability operations research community by providing experts for exercises, experiments, conferences, doctrine development, and guidance to researchers; also, by means of direct research sponsorship, distribution of research products and lessons learned assessments. PKSOI's strategic issues topic list frames a research and lessons learned program that addresses challenges identified through engagement with practitioners and scholars. The topic list intends to promote the development of peace and stability operations knowledge, education, training and doctrine, interagency assessment, and planning and operations. The 2009 Topic List is focused on themes identified in the October 2008 Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, emphasizing comprehensive and whole-of-government approaches to stability operations. … [Go to Topic List]

PKSOI in the News

PAPER SAYS U.S. LANDPOWER SHOULD RE-ORIENT TOWARD UNCONVENTIONAL WARS

As they begin work on the Quadrennial Defense Review, senior landpower officials "should reorient on a new unconventional balance point for force optimization," according to a new paper by a former Army Lieutenant Colonel.

Nathan Freier, a visiting professor at the Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes that the Pentagon "cannot long ignore the inadequacy of much of the current force for nontraditional challenges lurking on the strategic horizon."

[Go to complete Article]

Austere Challenge

Austere Challenge (AC09) is a traditional yearly Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) confederated Wargame. AC09 will train the European Command (EUCOM) and certify United States Army Europe (USAREUR) as a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters in both Combat and Stability Operations.

What is significant about this exercise is that the first elements of the Civilian Response Corps – Active will participate. The exercise will train Active component new hires in advanced Whole of Government (WoG) planning and operations. Additionally, this is the first time that Stability and Support Operations will be exercised in such a complex and integrated manner during a live simulated wargame.

The State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) through the R&S Policy Coordination Committee has produced the Interagency Management System (IMS). This system allows for a Whole-of-Government approach to solving or preventing conflict around the world. AC09 will use the IMS to integrate and assess parts of that system particularly the Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) (team that deploys to the GCC to synch the WoG Strategic Plan with operational orders) and the Advance Civilian Team (ACT) (that deploys to provide R&S support to an Embassy or other civilian capabilities if no Embassy exists – coordinates with the JTF). These teams will also continue to build a partnership with EUCOM, foster better civ-mil integration practices, and develop and exercise the ACT operational concept and planning framework.

The exercise will focus on three Major Mission Elements. The first involves Humanitarian Assistance with PRM, USAID, and DoD oversight. The second will be Economic Reconstruction involving Commerce, Treasury, USAID and DoD. The third will focus on Security Sector Reform/ Rule of Law issues that will be considered by INL, DoJ, JCISFA, and DoD.

As the Obama Administration develops WoG initiatives to promote Global Stability and integrate Military and Civilian Efforts, AC09 will take an important step towards accomplishing those objectives.

CNA, U.S. Army Outline Economic Solutions for Post-Conflict Society

Jump-starting economic growth following a violent conflict calls for immediately creating temporary jobs, boosting the quality and legitimacy of national institutions and allowing the "informal sector" to play a part, according to a draft report discussing stabilization and economic growth in post-conflict societies.

These key recommendations are part of a Nov. 12, 2008, workshop study issued by CNA (Center for Naval Analysis) and PKSOI (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute). The report surveyed key areas such as the macroeconomic sustainment of a post-conflict environment, microeconomic sustainment of wealth-creating societies, governance and rule of law, and the challenge of illegal and illicit economies.

Reactivating economic growth in countries in the aftermath of violent conflict calls for "measures different from those applied in conventional development," according to the authors, CNA's Franklin Kramer and Joseph Gregoire of PKSOI.

[Go to complete Article]

PKSOI Events

PKSOI Hosts United Nations Peacekeeping Exhibit

60
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Dignity and justice for all of us

Commemorating the 60th anniversary of the United Nations Peacekeeping efforts. This United Nations exhibit is intended to demonstrate and celebrate the role of Peacekeepers during over 60 years of UN efforts at peace operations. The exhibit is on display through the month of April daily Monday thru Friday 0800 to 1600 and located on the 2nd floor of Upton Hall. For additional information on the UN 60th Anniversary of Peacekeeping Operations please visit: http://www.un.org/events/humanrights/udhr60/index.shtml See photos of the exhibit below.

Experiments / Exercises:

~~ Austere Challenge 09 – Austere Challenge (AC09) will be used to certify United States Army Europe (USAEUR)/Seventh Army as a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) and for US European Command (EUCOM) to exercise its response procedures to future crises. The EUCOM Commander has directed that AC09 focus on concurrent combat and interagency stability operations. Upcoming milestones/spiral events include:

22 April-7 May: Exercise

~~ Unified Quest – Unified Quest is the Army's annual Title 10 Future Study Program comprising a series of wargames, seminars, workshops and conferences. It is the Army Chief of Staff's primary mechanism to explore enduring operational challenges and the conduct of operations in a future operational environment.

This year's Unified Quest campaign plan examines capabilities and capacities that likely will be required to meet strategic, joint force, and tactical challenges that the Joint Force and the Army expect to encounter from 2018 to 2025.

29 April-3 May: UQ09 STAFFEX / Carlisle Barracks, PA

4-8 May: UQ09 Future Game / Carlisle Barracks, PA

Experiments / Exercises:

April 20-24th: Global Synchronization Conference at USSOCOM, Tampa– 8 (GSC-8) IW DODD Work Group. SOCOM sponsors this global conference to discuss and coordinate issues of mutual concern in the areas of SOF, IW GWOT and Stability related items. Items for discussion will be the IW DOD Directive, the Operational Planning Guide, the CJCS Instructions, and service and JFCOM issues. Col Osborne the SOCOM J10 has been assigned as the team lead for IW.

April 20-24th: Conference of American Armies Training and Education Conference. This conference taking place in Uruguay, is the third in the CAA series of conference. Purpose of this conference is to analyze the application of standardized UN training and education modules (SGTM_1, STM-2 and STM-3) according to current action scenarios, to be better prepared for the training and validation of contingents, military observers and members of the Multinational Staff.

Jun 22- 26th: MNFSOP Thailand. Continuation of US-PACOM (J7) Multinational SOP development series to improve procedures for multinational military support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Focus is on improving the procedures/processes for the following major SOP sections: Multinational terminology; Multinational headquarters reports section ; detailed planning process.

Jun 26 - Jul 4th: Kazakhstan Engagement. PKSOI will support the OSD, PFP initiative to assist the National Defense University of Kazakhstan to develop a Peace Support Operations Curriculum. The objective is to communicate to the NDU of Kazakhstan how the West defines and teaches peace support operations. This will be through a series of lectures and workshops over a 4 day period. PKSOI is supporting EUCOM, NATO , PFP and the US Country Team in building partner capacity in accordance with the QDR roadmap.

Jul 1-9th: Challenges Seminar Pakistan. PKSOI has been the US partner in the Challenges Forum since 1997. The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is currently comprised of 16 partner nations and seeks to promote and broaden the international dialogue between key stakeholders addressing peace operations

issues in a timely, effective and inclusive manner.

In January 2009, PKSOI hosted a workshop that brought together military and civilian partners from governments and international organizations to plan and initiate a series of workshops and engagements designed to operationalize the three "core-businesses of peacekeeping operations" as stated in the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines document. The series is intended to, over the next 16 months, entail three parallel workshop strands, the results of which will be presented at the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations in Australia in April 2010.

USAWC Events of Interest:

~~ National Security Seminar (NSS) – The National Security Seminar takes place the first full week of June, immediately preceding the United States Army War College graduation ceremony. As part of the strategic outreach program, the National Security Seminar welcomes 160 civilian participants into student seminars for the capstone event of the academic year . Guests are invited to participate in open and honest discussions with students about the national security issues facing the nation. These discussions provide a mixture of opinions and give the topics new dimensions for faculty and students.